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When In Doubt, Take Them Out: Removal of Children from
Victims of Domestic Violence Ten Years After Nicholson v.
Williams1
LYNN F. BELLER*
INTRODUCTION
“[C]onsider what it means when the same court system that threatens to remove
a woman’s children because she has exposed them to an abusive partner also
tells her, if only by example, that they will not punish a man who has assaulted
her dozens, perhaps hundreds of times.”2

Domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to women in the U.S.3 Far
more Americans, mostly women, have been killed in the last dozen years at the
hands of their partners than in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 Worldwide,
women ages 15 to 44 are more likely to die or be maimed as a result of male
violence than as a consequence of war, cancer, malaria and traffic accidents
combined.5
Since the passage of the Violence Against Women Act in 1994, federal, state
and city agencies have made efforts to combat domestic violence. In New York
State in particular, Governor Andrew Cuomo created the Office for the
Prevention of Domestic Violence6 and former Mayor Michael Bloomberg created
the Mayor’s Office to Combat Domestic Violence.7 Until 2002, however, mothers
who had been victims of domestic violence in New York were often victimized
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twice: first by their abusers, and then by having their children taken away from
them..
On March 18, 2002, Judge Jack Weinstein dramatically changed New York
policy towards victims of domestic abuse.8 With his sweeping decision in
Nicholson v. Williams,9 he concluded that a mother’s inability to prevent her
children from witnessing domestic violence does not in itself constitute neglect,
and therefore cannot be the sole basis for an administrative agency’s removal of
her children from their family home.10 The court found that administrative
agencies in New York had perpetrated a number of wrongs against battered
mothers, including failing to provide the necessary services to ensure the
protection of the mothers and children, and “unnecessarily routinely
prosecut[ing] mothers for neglect and remov[ing] their children where the
mothers have been the victims of significant domestic violence, and where the
mothers themselves have done nothing wrong.”11 This decision was
subsequently upheld by the New York Court of Appeals, which held that merely
witnessing violence does not rise to the level of neglect that automatically
necessitates emergency removal, even though the emotional injury to a child that
results from witnessing domestic violence can satisfy the definition of a
“neglected child” and require the emergency removal of that child without a
court order.12
The plaintiffs’ circumstances in the Nicholson case were illustrative of the
“flawed understanding of domestic violence”13 that permeated the child welfare
system and prevented the appropriate treatment of mothers who were victims of
domestic violence. This article explains the holdings of the Nicholson cases and
explores why there are still instances where the practices of New York State’s
Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”) victimize mothers. ACS has
changed its policies and practices in the past ten years and has made some
improvement in holding abusers accountable. Nevertheless, ACS employees
continue to regularly allege neglect against battered mothers, who are much
easier targets. ACS still consistently fails to offer adequate services to victims of
domestic violence before prosecuting them or removing their children. ACS
employees are often too ready to judge victims and are frequently not equipped
to make sensitive decisions.
To understand why these practices continue even after the clear holding in
Nicholson, we must examine the institutional and psychological factors that
provide resistance to change. As with any large bureaucracy, ACS policies are
inevitably designed to preserve the organization. The risk to the organization of
leaving a child in a family environment that ends up being fatal with the ensuing
headline-grabbing publicity lurks in the background of the decision-making
8. Dorchen A. Leidholdt, Director, Center for Battered Women’s Legal Services,, Sanctuary for
Families, Remarks at the Edith I. Spivack Award Ceremony, New York County Lawyers’
Association’s
Women’s
Rights
Committee(Apr.
4,
2013)
(transcript
available
at
https://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications1607_0.pdf).
9. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
10. Id at 163-64.
11. Id.at 228-29.
12. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 854 (N.Y. 2004).
13. Stark, supra note 2, at 691.
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process. This risk may place unconscious pressure on ACS employees to err on
the side of caution. In addition, a large case load adds to the pressure to resolve
situations rapidly, without gaining a full understanding of the dynamics of
domestic violence. Without such an understanding, it is difficult to evaluate
whether the violence is a one-time event or a continuing pattern of abuse and to
develop alternatives for the family.
Part I of this article reviews the dynamics of the “stubborn problem” of
domestic violence and why abused women are often unable to leave their
batterers. Part II examines the system of child welfare in New York and explains
the ways in which aspects of the system have influenced the approach child
protective workers take to resolve the problem. Part III explores the holdings of
the Nicholson cases and their influence on the policies regarding removal of
children. Part IV examines several recent instances where victims have been
improperly treated by ACS employees. Part V concludes with recommendations
for potential improvements to the system.
I.

UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

“His jealousy soon escalated to violence, and Camila was trapped in cycles of
abuse, separation, reunion and greater abuse. She suffered a slow destruction of
her sense of self: “I felt like a worm,” she says, “ugly, black, good for nothing. I
felt no one else would love me.”14

Domestic violence is a pattern of gender-based intimate partner abuse,
designed to harm the physical and psychological well-being of the victims.
Despite increased awareness of the effects of domestic violence in the legal
system and society at large, and despite efforts of advocacy organizations like
Sanctuary for Families,15 Legal Momentum, and Safe Horizons, domestic
violence remains a challenging problem. According to the World Health
Organization, “thirty-five percent of women worldwide have been sexually
assaulted or subjected to domestic violence.”16 Domestic violence “strikes one
American woman in four and claims a life in the United States every six hours. . .
American women are twice as likely to suffer domestic violence as breast cancer,
and the abuse is particularly shattering because it comes from those we have
loved.”17 A woman is beaten every 15 seconds in the United States.18 As
Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus R. Vance noted recently, “domestic violence
[has] remained a stubborn problem in the city even as murder, assault and other
violent crimes have fallen significantly in the last decade. The office prosecuted
6,500 cases in 2013, up from 5,600 a decade ago.”19 The movement to combat
domestic violence in the U.S. began in the 1970s when advocates for women

14. SANCTUARY FOR FAMILIES, http://www.sanctuaryforfamilies.org/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=153&Itemid=176 (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
15. The author of this article served on the Board of Trustees for Sanctuary for Families from
2004-2013.
16. Nicholas Kristof, How Brave Girls Helped Crack a Taboo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, at A27.
17. Id.
18. National Domestic Violence Statistics, supra note 3.
19. James C. McKinley, Jr., Center That Aids Domestic Violence Victims Opens in Manhattan, N.Y.
TIMES Mar. 12, 2014, at A25.
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began to focus on creating emergency shelters for victims of domestic violence
and their children.20 Activists began to turn to the civil and criminal justice
systems to hold abusers accountable. Non-profit organizations focusing for the
first time on this issue effectively implemented societal, cultural, and legal
changes to improve the safety and security of women in intimate relationships.
Legal efforts included enforcement of existing civil and criminal legal remedies
for victims of domestic violence, and the development of additional remedies to
respond to the needs of victims. Training of police, prosecutors, and judges in
ways to identify domestic violence, and how to collect evidence and present it in
court, led to improved enforcement of state and federal criminal laws.21
The 1990s brought further dramatic improvements for victims. In 1994,
Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which was the first
national-level, comprehensive legal response to domestic violence and required
the interstate enforcement of civil protection orders.22 In the same year, New
York State passed the Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act,
which eliminated the need for victims to choose between civil and criminal
remedies. This act also “imposed a state-wide mandatory arrest law, requiring
police officers to make an arrest for domestic violence felonies, violations of stayaway orders of protection, and family offenses committed in violation of an
order of protection.”23
Despite these achievements, there is a continued lack of understanding of
the dynamics of domestic violence on the part of the judiciary, law enforcement,
welfare agencies and the general public. Domestic violence manifests not only in
physical assault, but also through a pattern of intimidation, isolation and control
over victims. As Dr. Evan Stark has stated:
[W]e have come to realize that the most devastating context for battering is when
minor physical abuse is embedded in a pattern that deprives women of basic
rights and resources, exploits them sexually and often monetarily, isolates them
from friends, family, professionals and other potential sources of support, and
implements a regime of regulation over everyday affairs.24

This kind of coercive control is not always apparent to an outside viewer.
The abuser gains access to an intimate knowledge of the victim’s life, and uses
that knowledge to control the victim even he is not with her. He knows her
habits, her fears, and her extended family. This intimate knowledge allows
batterers to manipulate the emotions of victims and to use their knowledge to
create problems in their lives.
Domestic violence encompasses many kinds of abusive behavior.
Perpetrators use a variety of psychological activities to intimidate their victims,
including brandishing weapons, threats of harm against the victim and her
family, and threats to kidnap the victim’s children. Abusers try to isolate their
20. Julie A. Domonkos, The Evolution of the Justice System’s Response to Domestic Violence in New
York State in LAWYER’S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE VICTIM, 1 (Jill Laurie
Goodman & Dorchen A. Leidholdt eds., 5th ed. 2006).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Domonkos, supra note 20, at 1-2.
24. Stark, supra note 2, at 713.
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victims and limit their contact with others.25 They misinform their victims,
through tactics such as lying and withholding information about the victims’
ability to legally remain in the U.S. or their ability to retain custody of their
children. Coercive and violent sex, as well as other forms of physical abuse, are
typical. Batterers also often use the legal system against the victim, by
threatening deportation, as well as by threatening to report drug abuse and
falsely reporting the victim to law enforcement so the victim is forced to defend
herself instead of protecting herself from the abuser. As we will see in detail
below, the abuser may threaten to file reports or actually file reports with social
service agencies to make the victim appear to be a neglectful mother. The abuser
may also prevent the victim from becoming financially self-sufficient in order to
maintain power and control.
A common misconception of outside observers is the belief that a battered
woman can leave an abusive relationship if she really wants to. This view makes
intuitive sense, but it ignores emotional, financial and other barriers that prevent
women from leaving.26 For example, if the abuser is the sole income provider in
the family, a mother may reject leaving as an option and put the financial wellbeing of her children ahead of her own safety. There is a shortage of shelters
specifically for women and children fleeing an abuser, and they are often forced
to stay in homeless shelters. Rather than subjecting her children to such a
dangerous environment, a woman may decide to remain with her abuser. A
woman may also stay in a violent relationship because she believes that leaving
would place her and her children at an even greater risk of harm. There is
evidence to support such fears, since “the risk of femicide increases directly after
separation.”27 Batterers escalate the violence when a woman tries to leave or
shows signs of independence.28 Studies show that “[N]early 90 percent of
intimate partner homicides by men have been shown to involve a documented
history of domestic violence, and a majority of these killings take place during or
following separation.”29
Women often stay due to legal and immigration concerns, fear of losing
their children, cultural or religious prohibitions on divorce, or a lack of family
support for the transition.30 Some victims start off as victims of sex trafficking
and don’t speak English.31 Some victims reason that they will sacrifice
themselves so their children will have a father or a home: “She stayed with a
25. See infra Part 5(c).
26. Susan McGee, Why Battered Women Stay [Actually, Why Some Battered Women Sometimes Stay],
STOPVIOLENCE.COM, http://stopviolence.com/domviol/whytheystay.htm (last visited Feb, 16, 2015).
27. Colleen Friend, Aron Shlonsky & Liz Lambert, From Evolving Discourses to New Practice
Approaches in Domestic Violence and Child Protective Services, 30 CHILD.. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. , 689,
690 (2008). See also Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 65-6 (1991) (developing the term “separation assault” to describe the
intensified violent assault an abuser inflicts upon his victim as punishment for her attempting to
leave the relationship).
28. LUNDY BANCROFT, JAY G. SILVERMAN &DANIEL RITCHIE, THE BATTERER AS PARENT:
ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 14 (2d ed. 2011).
29. Id. at 14.
30. Id.
31. Interviews with Dorchen Leidholdt, Director of the Center for Battered Women’s Legal
Services, Sanctuary for Families.
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violent boyfriend for years, she said, because he was the father of her daughters
and was always so apologetic afterward—and also because that was what she
had been told was a woman’s lot in life.”32 Even after they leave, victims may
still believe that their children need involvement with the father. Some victims
stay because there is no other place for them to go. There are also more subtle
psychological reasons why victims remain in abusive situations. A batterer
creates a feeling of powerlessness in his victim and may force her to believe she
must choose between her own safety and that of her children. In conclusion, a
woman who remains with her children in a violent environment is not
necessarily neglecting her children. She may be weighing two bad alternatives
and choosing the lesser of two evils.
II.

THE CONCEPT OF THE FAILURE TO PROTECT

“[C]hild protection is predisposed by its mission, programmatic structure and
peculiar role in our society to allow and may even compel even its most
progressive personnel to engage in morally and constitutionally indefensible
practices with respect to mothers. . .”33

In situations of abuse, law enforcement and advocacy efforts are focused on
protecting the victim from the abuser. When the victim is a mother, such efforts
intuitively should involve protection of the entire family. Unfortunately, a
misplaced effort to protect children from the impact of witnessing domestic
violence has resulted in an injustice perpetrated on mothers. In New York City,
the Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”), the nation’s largest Child
Protective Services (“CPS”) agency, has engaged in the presumptive removal of
children from battered mothers. CPS has charged these victims with neglect on
the theory that they “engaged” in acts of domestic violence and failed to protect
their children from witnessing such acts. Consequently, “victims of domestic
violence often suffer dual abuse, first in the hands of their assailants, and then in
the hands of the system.”34
A. Child Protection in New York
While there are federal guidelines and requirements for child protection,35
the primary responsibility for such protection rests with each state.36 The system
of child protection in New York is complicated and multilayered. Child abuse is
defined in New York in the Social Services Law37 and the Family Court Act.38
32. Kristof, supra note 4.
33. Stark, supra note 2, at 693.
34. Beth A. Mandel, The White Fist of the Child Welfare System: Racism, Patriarchy, and the
Presumptive Removal of Children from Victims of Domestic Violence in Nicholson v. Williams, 73 U. CIN.LL.
REV. 1131, 1131 (2005).
35. See Major Federal Legislation Concerned with Child Protection, Child Welfare, and Adoption,
CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY 1 (April 2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs
/majorfedlegis.pdf. (“The Federal Government started providing grants to States for preventive and
protective services and foster care payments in 1935 with the Child Welfare Services Program, Title
IV-B of the Social Security Act.”)
36. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
37. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 412 (McKinney 2014).
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Section 1012(f) of the New York Family Court Act defines a neglected child as
one “whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in
imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his
parent. . .to exercise a minimum degree of care.”39 The minimum degree of care
includes supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, and education
as well as providing proper supervision.40 The Act gives broad authority to the
state to investigate and protect against child abuse and neglect.41
The failure-to-protect doctrine stems from the premise that parents have an
obligation to protect their children from avoidable harm.42 Prior to the Nicholson
case, physical violence perpetrated by one parent against another could
constitute child neglect.43 As late as 1998, the statutory requirement that actual
harm or substantial risk of harm to the child be proven could be met by the mere
presence of domestic violence:44 “‘Failure to protect’ [charges] . . . arise when
parents do not prevent another person from abusing the children in their care, or
even when they permit these children to watch them being abused.”45 It is
important to note that defendants charged and convicted with failure to protect
are almost exclusively female. “As one advocate stated, ‘In the 16 years I’ve
worked in the courts, I have never seen a father charged with failure to protect
when the mom is the abuser. Yet, in virtually every case where Dad is the
abuser, we charge Mom with failure to protect.’”46 Cases involving “failure to
protect” typically evidence the view that the mother did not perform her
“maternal” role adequately to prevent the child from experiencing the abuse.
Often the mother is herself a victim of abuse, and the courts may consider that
she therefore knew or should have known about the batterer’s tendency to abuse.
However, “[s]uch decisions ignore the special circumstances of battered women,
which courts have considered in other contexts, such as when women are tried
for murdering their abusers.”47 Studies of state courts reveal a substantive
gender bias in abuse proceedings:48 “In 46.2% of the cases in which ACS files a
petition of neglect or abuse involving domestic violence, the batterer is not listed
at all, meaning that in these cases, the victim is held by the system to answer for
the batterer’s abuse.”49
The predominance of women as persons charged with child abuse and
neglect is often overlooked because we have become so accustomed to seeing

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012 (McKinney 2014).
Id. at (f).
Id.
See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012 practice cmt., (McKinney 2014).
Friend, Shlonsky & Lambert, supra note 27, at 690.
David Lansner, The Nicholson Decisions: New York’s Response to ‘Failure to Protect’ Allegations,
ABA COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications
/cdv_enewsletter_home/vol12_expert1.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
44. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012 practice cmt, (McKinney 2014).
45. Jeanne A. Fugate, Note, Who’s Failing Whom? A Critical Look at Failure-to-Protect Laws, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV.. 272, 273 (2001).
46. Id.at 274.
47. Id. at 280.
48. Id. at 287.
49. Mandel, supra note 34, at 1143.
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women in the courtrooms of Family Court. This ubiquity has led to an
internalization of the “bad mother” as the “person who is brought into Family
Court on child protection charges, and [a] compar[ison of] her to the mythical
‘ideal mother’ who would never be charged with any kind of child abuse or
neglect.”50 Commentators have noted that there is also an “implicit motherhood
bias”51 in the child welfare system.
For an example of an implicit motherhood bias being harmful in a Family
Court proceeding, imagine that a judge carries stereotypes about a ‘good’ mother
being selfless and subjugating her own needs to those of her children, and a ‘bad’
mother as one who is putting some other need before her children’s needs. Now,
when that judge is presiding over actual cases, she is implicitly seeing a
particular litigant as a ‘bad mother,’ if, for instance, the litigant uses illegal drugs,
or if she is in love with and lives with a batterer, or, perhaps, even if she works
the night shift.52
Similarly, when case workers interact with a mother who is a victim of
abuse, they are unconsciously evaluating her parenting ability against an ideal
image of the perfect mother.
In addition, the issue of racial bias plays a role in the system. Scholars
observing the Family Court “have long criticized the overrepresentation of lowincome litigants of color, characterizing Family Court as the ‘poor person’s
court,’ and have questioned whether the family law system itself is inherently
discriminatory toward persons of color.”53 In 2002, black individuals constituted
13% of the population as a whole, while comprising 37% of the foster care
population.54 Various scholars and practitioners have referred to the child
welfare system as an “apartheid institution.”55 Discussion of this problem is
beyond the scope of this article, but remains fertile ground for further
exploration.
B.

ACS Policy in New York

The child protection system in New York State begins with the Office of
Children and Family Services (“OCFS”), which regulates and monitors local
service agencies and maintains the State Central Register for Child Abuse and
Maltreatment (“SCR”). The State delegates responsibility for enforcing child
protection laws to counties and municipalities. 56 New York State is divided into
fifty-eight local social services districts. The five boroughs of New York City
comprise one district. In New York City, the primary agency responsible for
protecting children against abuse is ACS.57
50. Melissa L. Breger, The (In)visibility of Motherhood in Family Court Proceedings, 36 N.Y.U..REV.
LL. & SOC. CHANGE 555, 556 (2012).
51. Id. at 559.
52. Id.at 565-66.
53. Id. at 557.
54. Mandel, supra note 34, at 1150.
55. Id. at 1149.
56. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 166 (E.D.N.Y.2002).
57. NYC ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES, http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html
/home/home.shtml.
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The State Central Register is the conduit through which all investigations
regarding child abuse and neglect are initiated. The Register maintains a hotline,
and the most common way a case is initiated is when someone makes a report of
abuse or neglect. Reports come in from “mandated reporters” or anyone who
suspects or claims to suspect that a child is being abused or maltreated.58 There
is no screening of calls to the hotline, and therefore reporting can become an
effective tool for batterers to keep control of their victims. For example, a caller
can report a mother for allegedly neglecting to take her child on scheduled
doctor’s visits. Victims can be subject to repeat ACS investigations triggered by
calls to the hotline based solely on inventions of the batterers, and “[a] person
who makes a report is immune from liability even if the report is eventually
proven false.”59
Once a call comes in with allegations of suspected child abuse or neglect,
the report is transmitted to the local child protective services, like ACS. When an
ACS field office receives a report from SCR, an employee forwards it to a
supervisor (“Supervisor”). The Supervisor assigns a caseworker to investigate.
The investigation must take place within twenty-four hours of the report. A
“Child Protective Manager” (“CPM”), who oversees the Supervisor-Caseworker
team, “approves major decisions such as removing a child or prosecuting a
mother.”60
ACS is responsible for completing its investigations of complaints referred
by SCR within sixty days.61 ACS caseworkers will visit the home, interview the
parents and children and determine whether there is a risk of harm to the
children. When the investigation is completed, ACS must determine whether any
evidence supports the allegations. If ACS concludes there is such evidence, it
declares the report “indicated” and transmits its conclusions and supporting
reasons to SCR.62 There is no formal hearing at which the parents have the right
to be heard before the report is filed.63
If there is a risk, ACS must decide whether a child must be removed or
whether provision of services may be sufficient to prevent removal. In theory,
ACS may remove a child only if it first made appropriate and reasonable efforts
to prevent or eliminate the need for removal.”64 The reality confronted by the
Nicholson court was that ACS was routinely removing children without such
efforts.65
No department has responsibility for independently assessing the ACS
conclusion and there is no formal hearing to evaluate the decision.66 A report of
“indicated” can have severe consequences on an individual’s record. While SCR
is required to keep report records confidential, many individuals and
58. Lecture notes of Dorchen Leidholdt, Adjunct Professor, Columbia Law School(Feb. 6, 2015).
59. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 166.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 167.
65. Id.
65. See id. at 211 (explaining that ACS fails to offer adequate services to mothers before
prosecuting them or removing their children).
66. Id. at 166.
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organizations are statutorily authorized to access the records.67 Therefore, a
report of “indicated” may have consequences for an individual’s employment,
educational and financial opportunities.
If ACS determines that a child is at risk of harm, there is an obligation to
prepare a “family service plan” to attempt to avert that risk. The agency must
provide preventive services, including cash assistance, the assignment of a
homemaker, and provision of parenting classes and rent subsidies. If there is
domestic violence, the caseworker can assist the victim to obtain an order of
protection, provide counseling services and find an emergency shelter.68
The evidence in the Nicholson case revealed that many caseworkers
displayed a lack of understanding or awareness of domestic violence. As Judge
Weinstein noted:
[T]he father claimed the inherent right to beat his wife and children. . .He claims
that he is verbally and physically abusive for the cardinal reason of maintaining
order and good behavior among his family members. Despite this report, ACS
did not help Ms. Udoh [one of the plaintiffs] leave or attempt to remove Mr.
Udoh from the household, or limit his contact with his wife or children.69

If a caseworker believes that there is a risk of physical injury or harm to a
child, they are permitted to remove the child from the household. Removal for
more than twenty-four hours requires the commencement of an Article 10
proceeding in Family Court to have the child adjudicated as abused or
neglected.70 As the petitioner, ACS prosecutes actions brought in Family Court.71
Once a child is removed, the parent can petition for a hearing which must be
held within three court days of the application. Once ACS has filed a petition, the
Family Court is required to hold a preliminary hearing “as soon as practicable”
to determine whether the child’s interests require protection.72 The court has the
power to order removal of the child if that is judged necessary to avoid imminent
danger to the child’s life or health.73 Among other factors, the court must
consider whether ACS made appropriate and reasonable efforts to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal.74 The court also determines whether imminent
risk would be eliminated by a temporary order of protection directing the
removal of a person from the child’s residence.75
If ACS determines that there is not enough time to file a petition and hold a
preliminary hearing, it is authorized to seek, and the Family Court is empowered
to issue, a preliminary order of removal.76 In deciding whether to issue such an
order, the court considers available protective services, including the removal of

67. Id. at 167.
68. Leidholdt, supra note 58.
69. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
70. Id. at 167. See also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1032(a) (McKinney 2014); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 397
(2)(b), 424(11) (McKinney 2014).
71. Nicholson, 203 F.Supp. 2d. at 167.
72. Id.; see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1027(a) (McKinney 2014).
73. NY FAM. CT. ACT § 1027(b)(i) (McKinney 2014).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1022.
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offending persons from the residence.77 The court must consider whether the
agency made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child; if not, the
court can order that these efforts be made.78 If the court orders removal, then it
will either send the child to a foster care agency or find a “suitable” person to
take care of the child other than the respondent parent.
It would appear that the Family Court Act provides victims of domestic
violence with adequate safeguards to prevent unnecessary removal of their
children. However in reality its protections are often ignored.79 As Judge
Weinstein noted, “In many other cases, petitions in Family Court allege neglect
and domestic violence against the mother even when she has herself committed
no violence and is separated from the batterer, and is caring for her child with no
evidence of harm to the child.”80
If ACS decides that there is inadequate time to obtain this expedited
preliminary order, it may remove a child from her parents without a court
order.81 If ACS removes a child without a court order it must file a petition
“forthwith,” which is generally taken to mean within twenty-four hours and no
more than three business days.82 However, as we will see below, ACS often
interprets the rules loosely. If a child is removed prior to a court order (which
must be issued only following a hearing where the parents were present and had
the opportunity to be represented by counsel), the parents have the right to
apply for a court hearing to secure the child’s return.83 This can lead to a long
and arduous fact-finding stage which places a tremendous burden on families.
As Nicholas Scoppetta, former Commissioner of ACS, remarked, “Once you are
in the Family Court, you are in it very often for many months before you can get
to the substance of the case.”84
After provisional arrangements for the child have been determined, the
court proceedings move to the fact-finding stage. At the fact-finding hearing to
determine whether a child has been abused or neglected, ACS has the burden of
proving its case by a preponderance of the evidence. A finding that a child is
abused or neglected means that the State will continue its involvement in the
family’s life for a long time. The dispositional hearing is the last phase of the
proceeding. Courts have great discretion in determining whether to place the
children in foster care or to return them to the custody of their parents with
certain specified conditions.85
77. Id.
78. Leidholdt, supra note 58.
79. Id.
80. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 192 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
81. Id at 167. See also N.Y. SOC. SEV. LAW § 1024 (McKinney 2014) (providing for the emergency
removal of children without a court order); N.Y. SOC. SEV. LAW § 417 (detailing the process by which
children are taken into protective custody); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 594 (2d Cir. 1999)
(stating that a child may be taken into protective custody without parental consent).
82. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 1024(b)(iii) (McKinney 2014).
83. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 1028.
84. Jaime Perrone, Note, Failing to Realize Nicholson’s Vision: How New York’s Child Welfare System
Continues to Punish Battered Mothers, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 647 (quoting Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at
168).
85. Child Protective Proceedings (Abused or Neglected Children), New York City Family Court,
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/family/faqs_abusedchildren.shtml (last accessed Mar. 21,
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In 2002, at the time of the Nicholson case, the approach of child welfare
agencies to battered women was embodied in a standing directive that instructed
caseworkers to resolve “any ambiguity regarding the safety of the child . . . in
favor of removing the child from harm’s way.”86 In other words, when there is
doubt about the safety of the child, remove the child immediately. In addition,
there was no accountability for punitive practices in domestic violence cases, no
technical assistance available to help resolve any ambiguities, and an
overburdened legal staff.87 Therefore, removal (with or without a court order)
became the effective policy of child welfare agencies.88
An example of this approach can be seen in ACS’s treatment of Shiqipe
Berisha, the mother of a two-year old child. The child’s father suddenly attacked
her and dragged her across the apartment while she held her son.89 The police
arrested both Ms. Berisha and her batterer. The District Attorney declined to
prosecute her and she was released. Despite the D.A. decision, ACS took the
child into custody without a court order. Two weeks after removal of the child,
Ms. Berisha went to Family Court in an attempt to get her child back. The court
was unable to provide her with an attorney and refused to consider the case
without one. Finally, more than a month after removal, the child was ultimately
returned to his mother, but ACS continued to prosecute the mother for neglect in
Family Court.90
C. Effects on Children of Exposure to Domestic Violence
The presumption that there are traumatic effects on children of exposure to
domestic violence is based on findings that “[c]hildren of battered women have
been found to be at increased risk for a broad range of emotional and behavioral
difficulties, including suicidality, substance abuse, depression, developmental
delays, education and attention problems, and involvement in violence.”91
However, there has been a “consistent failure of researchers, including the range
of advocates who consulted with ACS, to conceptualize the widely documented
‘over-lap’ between domestic violence and harms to children’s welfare.”92 Studies
have shown that the psychological impact of being wrenched from the home and
care of the mother can cause even greater damage.93 Indeed, removing a child
from his mother may be “more damaging to the child than doing nothing at
all.”94
2015).
86. Stark, supra note 2, at 693
87. Id. at 693–94.
88. Id.
89. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
90. Id. at 189-90.
91. Bancroft et al.,, supra note 28, at 1.
92. Stark, supra note 2, at 699.
93. Id.
94. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 204; see also MICHAEL S. WALD, S. WALD, J.M. CARLSMITH & P.H.
LEIDERMAN, PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 10-11 (1988). (“Attachment theory
predicts several different ways in which removal from home may be harmful to a child. In addition
to the pain of separation, which often is very profound, a lengthy separation from a primary
caretaker may permanently impair the child’s attachment to that person, even if the separation is not
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The presumption in favor of removing children from domestic violence
situations unfairly places the onus on a mother to remove herself and her
children from an abusive situation.95 Child welfare agencies interact primarily
with women with the stated objectives of creating better mothers and better
environments for the children. Fathers and father-surrogates are essentially
ignored. Parenting skills programs have also typically been aimed at mothers:
“Given its historical tendency to define mothers as its clients, but not fathers,
once CPS determined to treat exposure to domestic violence as an emergent
situation requiring removal, the third background factor followed—the
application of the failure to protect and neglect doctrines to non-offending
parents.”96 In addition to the systemic and psychological factors, political and
historical factors put additional pressure on child welfare workers to err on the
side of over-protecting children at the expense of their mothers.
At the time of the Nicholson case, the New York City child-welfare system
was ripe for change.97 Despite a number of previous attempts to reform the
child-welfare system, there had been no lasting structural impact. For most of
the 20th century, the philosophical goals of child welfare had centered on the
objective of keeping families intact and providing services to help impoverished
families support their children.98 With the publication of research about the
“battered child syndrome”99 in 1962, [t]he ‘battered child’ became the subject of
numerous news articles, and within a decade every state passed laws that
required medical professionals to report children who showed possible signs of
mistreatment. The responsibility to look into all allegations of mistreatment soon
overwhelmed the resources of child-welfare agencies. They largely cast aside
their mission of easing child poverty and eventually began investigating the
dysfunctions surrounding more than two million children a year. The interests
of children were often pitted against those of their parents, who were treated as
potential suspects.”100
During the 1980s and 1990s, the approach of child welfare agencies was to
remove children from substance abusing parents and “to swiftly find new
permanent families for children whose parents were unable or unwilling to
assume responsibility.”101 This policy eventually became a subject of intense
dispute between two academics, Elizabeth Bartholet and Martin Guggenheim.
Professor Bartholet argued that the approach of child welfare agencies failed to
protect children from abuse and neglect and advocated removing children from
their biological families and placing them for adoption. Professor Guggenheim
responded that future generations would regard the policy of “banishing
permanent. Perhaps the greatest threat, however, occurs when the child is separated permanently
from an attachment figure and is either unable to develop a new relationship or is denied the
opportunity to do so.”).
95. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
96. Stark, supra note 2, at 703.
97. Interview with Jane Spinak, Professor, Columbia Law School (Aug. 1, 2013).
98. Rachel Aviv, Where is Your Mother?: A Woman’s Fight to Keep Her Child,NEW YORKER, Dec. 2,
2013, at 52, 55.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 56.
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children from their birth families” as a tragic social experiment.102 He argued
that “the use of coercive state power to redistribute children from their biological
parents to others deemed by the state to be superior caregivers should be
restricted to rare and extreme cases, and resorted to only when less drastic
measures had failed.”103 The failure of policy-makers to heed his advice is
evidenced by the dramatic increase in the number of children placed in foster
care during that time period: the number of children entering foster care rose by
nearly 250,000 children from 1980 to 2000.104
In the 1970s and early 1980s, public attention also began to be focused on
the impact of domestic violence on women, leading to the creation of services to
protect victims. There was developing research on the impact on victims, and in
the 1980s and 1990s, a body of evidence expanded the notion of who counted as a
victim: research suggested that it was harmful for children to be exposed to
domestic violence.105 This research led to some child protection agencies
“defining exposure to domestic violence as a form of child maltreatment.”. . .”106
Children previously had not had not been included in the domestic violence
equation as victims. The philosophical divide between advocates for domestic
violence victims and advocates for children resulted in the development of child
welfare policies and practices around children’s exposure to domestic violence
without adequate input from experts in domestic violence. “Following the
presumption that being ‘exposed’ to domestic violence harms children, CPS
[ACS] and courts in many states…instituted a policy of charging battered
mothers with neglect and temporarily removing their children if it was alleged
that the children witnessed the violence or were otherwise exposed to it.”107
The language used in these allegations was “engaging in domestic
violence”. This language implied that there were two actors engaging in the
violence, instead of one batterer and one victim, and that both actors made the
choice to engage in the act. For example, the language used in the neglect
petition filed by ACS against Sharlene Tillett, as cited in the Nicholson decision,
alleged that she “engage[d] in acts of domestic violence in the presence of subject
child.”108 The facts revealed that she had been choked by her batterer.
These child welfare policies had devastating consequences for victims of
domestic violence who were “re-victimized and re-cast as potentially harmful to
their offspring by the very system designed to protect their children.”109
D. Influence of Child Abuse Cases
Against this background, there were several headline-grabbing incidents of
102. Id. at 58.
103. Id.
104. Sandra Stukes Chipungu & Tricia B. Bent-Goodley, Meeting the Challenges of Contemporary
Foster Care, 75, 77-79 (2004).
105. Friend, Shlonsky & Lambert, supra note 27, at 690.
106. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
107. Stark, supra note 2, at 696-97.
108. Nicholson,, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 171. See also, infra Part IV (discussing the Nicholson decision in
detail).
109. Friend, Shlonsky & Lambert, supra note 27, at 690.
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child abuse that would reinforce the default view that removing children was the
appropriate response to situations of domestic abuse.
In 1995, the story of Elisa Izquierdo made city and national headlines. Sixyear old Elisa, having suffered a lifetime of abuse, was finally murdered by her
mother.110 Despite repeated complaints to child welfare authorities, the system
missed numerous opportunities to intervene with her family and save her life.111
Elisa became a symbol of a dysfunctional bureaucracy, one that allowed a drug
addict to retain custody of her daughter despite numerous reports of abuse.112
The resulting outcry led to an overhaul of New York City’s child welfare system
and the passage in Albany of Elisa’s Law,113 a measure that loosened the secrecy
regulations in child-abuse investigations.114 Among other reforms, the law
required a public accounting of the events leading up to the death of any child in
New York State who had been reported as abused or neglected.115 An additional
change was the decision of Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, who had cut funds from
the city’s child welfare agency early in his tenure, to provide funds to hire two
hundred new caseworkers, reorganize the children’s agency, and make it directly
accountable to the Mayor. He hired Nicholas Scoppetta, who was himself raised
in foster care, as the Commissioner of the newly-created Administration of
Children’s Services.116 Commissioner Scoppetta increased the required training
for caseworkers and mandated refresher courses in “risk assessment.”117
Nonetheless, one year later, a judicially appointed panel of specialists found
that ACS employees continued to endanger the lives of children with the same
errors that led to Elisa’s death.118 The panel found no improvement in the
quality of investigations of abuse, finding that the city failed to perform even the
most rudimentary tasks required by the law.119 The events and publicity
inevitably created a risk-averse approach, on the part of ACS employees,
towards assessing children and their families. Over the course of one year, the
number of children removed by the City from their parents increased by almost
50%:120 “Overwhelmed, panicked workers [were] more likely to make bad, snap
110. See Joyce Purnick, Elisa’s Death: A Year Later, Hints of Hope,N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/21/nyregion/elisa-s-death-a-year-later-hints-of-hope.html.
111. See Joe Sexton, Mother of Elisa Izquierdo Pleads Guilty to Murder in a Pivotal Child Abuse Case,
N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/25/nyregion/mother-of-elisaizquierdo-pleads-guilty-to-murder-in-a-pivotalchild-abuse-case.html. (“That Elisa was at risk had
been known for years to child welfare officials, the Family Court, social workers, schoolteachers and
others.”).
112. Jo Craven McGinty, State Keeps Death Files of Abused Children Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2012,
at A21.
113. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(a) (McKinney2014).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Purnick, supra note 110.
117. Barbara Stack, Open Justice: Little Girl's Murder Brought New York's Juvenile Court Proceedings
into
the
Light,
PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE
(Sept.
24,
2001),
http://old.postgazette.com/regionstate/20010924d2courtmainreg2.asp.
118. Rachel L. Swarns, Panel Faults Caseworkers in Child Abuse, N.Y.. TIMES (Aug. 14, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/14/nyregion/panel-faults-caseworkers-in-child-abuse.html.
119. Id.
120. Nina Bernstein, 2 Deaths Narrow Focus on Child Welfare Agency’s Changes and Limits, N.Y.
TTIMES, (Nov. 18, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/18/nyregion/2-deaths-narrow-focus-
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decisions in both directions. So more children [were] needlessly taken from
homes that [were] safe, or could be made safe with the right services, even as
other children [were] left in danger.”121
In 1996, another incident sparked a class action lawsuit on behalf of a class
represented by Marisol, a child who had been confined to a closet for several
months, deprived of sustenance and both physically and sexually abused.122
Marisol’s aunt and foster mother had both filed reports of abuse with ACS with
no response from the agency.123
Representatives of eleven children who had suffered abuse and neglect
because of the failures of ACS filed a civil rights action for violation of the
children’s rights under the state child welfare laws, in Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v.
Giulian124 Marisol had originally been placed in foster care while her mother was
incarcerated on drug charges. However, in 1994 ACS restored Marisol to her
mother’s care, despite reports that she had continued to abuse Marisol even
during visits while she was in foster care. The Marisol case was settled in 1999
with the establishment of an advisory panel of child welfare experts that would
oversee ACS’s reform efforts.125 In 2003, a report published by attorneys at
Children’s Rights entitled “Continuing Danger: A Report on Child Fatalities in
New York City” concluded that there was a recurrent pattern of caseworker and
agency mistakes:126 “Many critics say the emphasis on removing children from
their home to protect them –’When in doubt, take them out’ caseworkers say—
has gone too far, hurting children who, with help, would be safer with their own
parents than in foster care.”127
Against this background, there have been continuing incidents of parental
violence towards children, reinforcing the approach of removing children to
prevent abuse. In 2008, seven-year-old Nixzmary Brown was tortured, beaten
and killed by her stepfather, César Rodriguez.128 Her mother, Nixzaliz Santiago,
ignored Rodriguez as he slammed Brown’s head into a bathtub and doused her
with cold water. Both Santiago and Rodriguez were charged with second-degree
murder and child endangerment. Rodriguez was convicted on a verdict of firstdegree manslaughter and other charges, and was sentenced to 29 years in prison.
Santiago was convicted of manslaughter, assault and other charges.129
Evidence of previous abuse inflicted on Nixzmary came to light, and the
news coverage of her murder case later drew public attention. Again, it was
on-child-welfare-agency-s-changes-and-limits.html.
121. Id. (quoting Richard Wexler, director of the National Coalition for Child Protection Reform).
122. Marisol A. ex rel Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
123. Id.
124. 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997).
125. Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 185 F.R.D. 152 (S.D.N.Y.1999), aff'd 218 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.
2000).
126. Continuing Danger: A Report on Child Fatalities in New York City,
CHILDRENSRIGHTS.ORG,
http://web.archive.org/web/20101225073632/http://www.children
rights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/continuing_danger_february_2003.pdf.
127. Nina Bernstein, Pattern Cited in Missed Signs of Child Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/22/nyregion/pattern-cited-in-missed-signs-of-child-abuse.html.
128. Kareem Fahim, Mother Gets 43 Years in Death of Child, 7, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/nyregion/13nixzmary.html?_r=0.
129. Id.
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found that ACS had received previous complaints about Brown’s family, and
ultimately disciplined six employees who were working on the investigation.130
In March, 2006, a City panel created by Mayor Michael Bloomberg in response to
Brown’s death, advocated changes in the system.131 “Nixzmary’s Law” was
passed in 2009, making life without parole the maximum sentence for killing a
child in an “especially cruel and wanton manor.”132
In 2010, in another incident of ACS failure, Marchella Pierce was found
dead, after having been drugged, beaten and tied to a bed by her mother and
grandmother.133 The family was already under the supervision of ACS when the
events unfolded, “[a]nd when she came under the watch of the city’s
Administration for Children’s Services, an agency remade a number of times
after child deaths, her well-being fell to caseworkers who, prosecutors say,
essentially ignored the family.”134 Two former employees of the agency pleaded
guilty to misdemeanor charges in December 2013.135
These repeated incidents of abuse in families under the supervision of ACS
heighten the pressure on ACS workers when they encounter a situation of
domestic violence. It is understandable and appropriate that ACS workers view
removal of children as a possible response if they perceive potential harm to the
child. However, the nuanced approach required in a situation of domestic
violence involves evaluating the extent to which the abuse is directed only
against the mother, whether the abuse is likely to happen again, and whether
removing a child is really the optimal solution. The headline-grabbing errors in
judgment increase the perceived dangers of leaving a child in a dangerous
situation. However, without an adequate understanding of the dynamics of
domestic violence and experience in dealing with those types of situations, it is
difficult to accurately assess the actual risk to a child. For example, it is important
to be able to distinguish between a one-time violent event, and a continued
pattern of domestic violence. It is essential to recognize a situation of abuse
where intervention could prevent future incidents. The impact of removal on a
child’s psychological and emotional well-being must be measured against the
potential harm resulting from viewing an incident of domestic violence.136 This
130. Press Release, N.Y.C. Administration for Children’s Services, ACS Disciplines Staff in
Brooklyn Fatality, Reorganizes Administration to Improve Child Protection Services, and Initiates
DOI Investigation(Jan. 18, 2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html/pr_archives
/pr06_01_18.shtml.
131. Sewell Chan, City to Adopt Changes in Handling of Abuse Cases, N.Y. TIMES (March 30, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/30/nyregion/30abuse.html.
132. Glenn Blain, Gov. Paterson signs Nixzmary's Law, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 9, 2009),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/gov-paterson-signs-nixzmary-law-article1.381561#ixzz30UbMTG00.
133. N.R. Kleinfield & Mosi Secret, A Bleak Life, Cut Short at 4, Harrowing from the Start, N.Y.
TIMES (May 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/nyregion/short-bleak-life-ofmarchella-pierce-emaciated-4-year-old.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
134. Id.
135. Al Baker, State Official Appointed by de Blasio as Leader of Child Welfare Agency, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/23/nyregion/de-blasio-picks-state-socialservices-official-to-lead-city-childrens-agency.html.
136. See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“For those children who
are in homes where there is domestic violence, disruption of that bond can be even more traumatic
than situations where there is no domestic violence. Dr. Stark asserted that if a child is placed in
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kind of balanced reflection is difficult to do in an atmosphere of fear, time
pressure and restricted resources.
The history of child abuse in New York and the recurrent errors of
judgment on the part of ACS, are likely to provide a fearful and risk-averse
environment for those involved in protection of children. This fear can outweigh
a balanced assessment for child protective workers who “recognize that if they
recommend returning a child to a deadly home ‘it will be a career ender…It will
sully their reputations forever.’ They may choose a knowable tragedy, the
separation of a parent and child, in order to prevent an unknowable one.”137 The
key is having the judgment to distinguish between a home that presents dangers
for a child and a home where the mother is the victim of an abuser but a suitable
mother for the child.
III.

THE ABUSIVE PRACTICES UNCOVERED BY NICHOLSON

“ACS unnecessarily routinely prosecutes mothers for neglect and removes their
children where the mothers have been the victims of significant domestic
violence, and where the mothers themselves have done nothing wrong.”138

A. Nicholson v. Williams
The case of Nicholson v. Williams139 illustrates the ways in which ACS
routinely removed children from mothers who were victims of abuse, in
violation of the mothers’ and children’s substantive and procedural due process
rights. The case began in 2000, when Sharwline Nicholson filed a complaint
against ACS and New York City alleging that ACS had removed her children
simply because she had been the victim of domestic assault, and that this
removal was unwarranted and violated her and her children’s constitutional
rights.140 A few months later, Ekaete Udoh and Sharlene Tillett filed similar
complaints.141 These three women were the lead plaintiffs of a class action
lawsuit involving all mothers and children similarly situated. Seventeen
battered mothers provided testimony.142 The court certified class action, and
granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs, holding that “ACS’s conduct
substantially infringed on fundamental liberty interests of mothers and children
without advancing compelling or substantial state interest.”143 Judge Weinstein
strongly criticized ACS’s “pitiless double abuse” of battered mothers.144
The injunction resulted from a 24-day trial, during which the court heard
foster care as a result of domestic violence in the home, then he or she may view such removal as a
‘traumatic act of punishment….’”)
137. Aviv, supra note 98, at 54.
138. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d. at 228.
139. Id.
140. Maureen K. Collins, Comment, Nicholson v. Williams: Who Is Failing To Protect Whom?
Collaborating The Agendas of Child Welfare Agencies And Domestic Violence Services To Better Protect And
Support Battered Mothers And Their Children, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 725, 731 (2004).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d. at 266.
144. Id. at 162–63.
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testimony regarding the policies and practices of ACS, domestic violence and
child welfare, and the effects of domestic violence and removal from the home on
children.145 The opinion included an account of the experiences of ten different
women who had similar interactions with ACS.
The three lead plaintiffs’ stories illustrate how the “ACS system results in
the forcible and unjustified separation of abused mothers and their children.”146
1. Sharwline Nicholson
In 1999 Sharwline Nicholson was a single working mother of two young
children.147 She had an eight-year-old son from a previous relationship and a
three-year-old daughter from her relationship with Claude Barnett. Mr. Barnett
lived in South Carolina and made monthly visits to Brooklyn to visit the
family.148 On one of his visits, Ms. Nicholson told him she wanted to end their
relationship and Mr. Barnett assaulted her. He had never previously acted
violently towards her. This was an isolated attack, provoked by his rage that she
was leaving him.
The assault had occurred during the day. Ms. Nicholson’s son was at school
and her daughter was in her crib sleeping in the next room. When Mr. Barnett
left, Ms. Nicholson called 911, and arranged for a neighbor to care for her
children while she went to the hospital. In the emergency room she discovered
that she had suffered a broken arm, fractured ribs and head injuries.
Three police officers came to see her in the hospital. When she found out
that she would have to stay in the hospital overnight, she gave them the names
of two family members who could care for her children. Instead of bringing the
children to these relatives, however, representatives of ACS removed Ms.
Nicholson’s children from the neighbor’s home, and brought them to a
temporary residence. The following day an ACS worker refused to tell Ms.
Nicholson where her children were, and told her that if she wanted to see her
children again she had to appear in court the next week. Despite requests from
Ms. Nicholson to allow her children to stay with relatives, they were eventually
placed in foster care with strangers.149
An ACS caseworker was assigned to the Nicholson case. In his deposition
at trial, he conceded that it is common in domestic violence cases for ACS to wait
a few days before going to court after removing a child (which is not permissible
according to §1026150), because as the mother gets increasingly desperate to get
her children back, she will agree to any and all of the conditions required by ACS
for the children’s return without the matter going to court.151 The caseworker
testified that he did not believe that Ms. Nicholson was actually neglectful but

145. Id. at 163.
146. Id. at 168.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 168-69.
149. Id. at 170.
150. Id. at 168 (“If the ACS removes a child without a court order, it file[s] a petition “forthwith,”
which is generally taken to mean within twenty-four hours and no more than three business days.”)
151. Id. at 170.
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hoped that she would be forced to cooperate to protect herself and her children.152
He did not file a petition with the Family Court until three business days after
the children were placed in foster care.153 In his testimony, he tried to justify his
approach by stating that he believed it would not be safe for Ms. Nicholson and
her children to return to the residence and that she had never obtained an order
of protection.154 If he had properly investigated the family situation, he would
have discovered that Mr. Barnett lived in South Carolina, did not have a key to
the apartment, and that Ms. Nicholson had tried to obtain an order of protection
that had been denied because Mr. Barnett lived out of state.
Judge Weinstein concluded, “The allegations of neglect on the part of
Nicholson resulting from [the case manager’s] failure to properly investigate the
situation evince either blatant bias against victims of domestic abuse or
inexcusable ignorance of what abuse victims face.”155 The allegations implied
that both Ms. Nicholson and Mr. Barnett engaged in acts of domestic violence in
the presence of the children, when the facts clearly showed that Ms. Nicholson
was merely the victim. In addition, ACS claimed that Ms. Nicholson failed to
cooperate with services offered by ACS, when in reality none were offered.
On February 4, 1999, the Family Court ordered that Ms. Nicholson’s
children be returned to her, on the condition that she and the children stay at her
cousin’s home. Despite the court’s ruling, there was a 14-day delay before Ms.
Nicholson’s children were returned to her because ACS claimed that they were
concerned that there were not enough beds at the cousin’s home. Although
adequate housing is always a concern for managers evaluating family
circumstances, this appears to have been a fabricated reason for keeping the
children away from Ms. Nicholson. She was allowed to see the children only
once during this time period and only under supervised visitation at an ACS
foster agency. On February 18, 21 days after the removal and 14 days after the
Family Court had paroled Ms. Nicholson’s children to her, ACS returned her
children to her.156
Following the return of Ms. Nicholson’s children, ACS claimed to have
difficulty visiting with her and her children and filed a warrant application.
Fearing that ACS would take her children again, Ms. Nicholson sent them
temporarily to Jamaica to live with her father. On April 7, Ms. Nicholson was
handcuffed and arrested at a local post office and brought into Family Court. She
explained that her children were in Jamaica and was ordered to return to court
with them on April 24. She complied and the court permitted her to continue to
live in her own apartment with her children, as long as she cooperated with
supervision and the services offered by ACS. After Ms. Nicholson complied with
these conditions, ACS eventually dropped the petition against her in August.
Nevertheless, she continued to be listed on ACS records as a neglectful parent.157

152.
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2. Ekaete Udoh158
Ekaete Udoh was born and raised in Nigeria, and, following an arranged
marriage, came to the U.S. with her husband. She lived in Kentucky from 1977 to
1982. During that time, Ms. Udoh had five daughters and was routinely beaten
by her husband. She testified that she called the police “many” times to report
the abuse, but the police never arrested her husband.159
The family moved to New York in 1984, and the beatings continued. In
1985, Ms. Udoh called the police. The police came, but did not arrest Mr. Udoh
and did nothing to assist Ms. Udoh or the children.160 An ACS investigation in
1996 concluded that Mr. Udoh claimed that “under his Nigerian cultural
upbringing, he was allowed to engage in corporal punishment as a means of
controlling the ‘so-called unruly behavior of his children, and that this even
extend[ed] to the disciplining of his wife’s behavior.’”161 Despite this report, ACS
did not help Ms. Udoh to leave or attempt to remove Mr. Udoh from the house
or limit his contact with his family.
In 1999, Mr. Udoh physically assaulted one of his daughters. Ms. Udoh sent
her daughter to school, but came to pick her up to take her to the doctor. When
school officials discovered the cause of the injury, they reported the incident to
ACS.162
On May 6, a caseworker came to interview the family and told Mr. Udoh
that she would call the police if he continued to reside in the home. She brought
Ms. Udoh and the children to the ACS office to file a complaint. When they
returned to the home, Mr. Udoh had packed his clothes, left the house, and never
came to the home again, returning to Nigeria the following year. While at the
ACS offices, the caseworker told Ms. Udoh to appear in Family Court the
following day. Although ACS testified that they did not consider the children to
be in imminent danger if they remained with the mother, ACS filed a neglect
petition against her the following day on the basis that she had “engaged” in
domestic violence.163 The caseworker testified that the basis for the neglect
petition was the fear that no one would be home when the children (aged 12, 13,
16, and 17) returned home after school because the parents would be in Family
Court. On May 7, the caseworker removed the children from school while the
mother was at work. The petition filed by ACS with the court had only blank
spaces where answers were required for why insufficient time was available to
obtain a court order prior to removal and why removal of the children was
necessary.164
On May 20, after an investigation, the Family Court ordered the children
returned to the mother. Yet it took eight days for ACS to notify the foster care
agency to return them. The delay prompted Legal Aid to file an application
seeking immediate release of the children from ACS custody. Ironically, in this
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application the children’s attorney noted that the delay was harming the children
because, among other reasons, the foster mother refused to give the children
house keys so they were often locked out of their foster home.165
3. Sharlene Tillett166
In 1995, Ms. Tillett moved from Belize to New York with her son to live with
her husband.167 Shortly thereafter, she and her husband separated. Ms. Tillett
began a relationship with a man who grew increasingly jealous of her previous
husband and became physically abusive. In August 1999, she entered the
hospital to give birth to her second child, Uganda, and reported to the staff that
there was a history of domestic violence against her by the father. After the birth
of her child, the father drove her home but did not enter the apartment. The
hospital made a report to SCR, and a caseworker from ACS visited Ms. Tillett at
her apartment. The caseworker found satisfactory conditions and did not
remove the child.168
The following day ACS removed Uganda without a court order based on
their view that Uganda was in “imminent danger”169 because Ms. Tillett and the
baby were being supported by the batterer, even though Ms. Tillett reported that
the batterer had moved out and that she expected family support. Ms. Tillett
was breastfeeding the baby when she was removed. The following day ACS
filed a neglect petition against Ms. Tillett and the father, alleging that they
engaged in domestic violence in the presence of the child.170 This was clearly
fictitious since Uganda was not even born when Ms. Tillett reported the instances
of abuse. On September 3, the Family Court remanded Uganda to ACS with
privilege to parole, which meant that ACS could return Uganda to her mother if
they determined that the residence was safe.171
Ms. Tillett had moved into a new residence in her own name, obtained
employment and supported herself, and began classes in domestic violence and
parenting. Nevertheless, ACS still refused to return Uganda to her mother
because they thought Ms. Tillett should undergo a psychological evaluation.
There had been no mention in the court order of such requirement. Ms. Tillett
objected to the psychological evaluation, and it was not until two months after
the separation, on October 20, that Uganda was ultimately returned to her
mother.172
4. The Decision
“It desecrates fundamental precepts of justice to blame a crime on the victim.”173

After a twenty-four day trial, including forty-four witnesses and two
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hundred and twelve documents, Judge Weinstein granted a preliminary
injunction requiring ACS to implement certain conditions.174 Judge Weinstein
found that ACS policies and procedures violated a number of constitutional
rights of battered mothers and their children. Judge Weinstein concluded that in
many other cases, ACS filed petitions in Family Court alleging “neglect and
domestic violence against the mother even when she has herself committed no
violence and is separated from the batterer, and is caring for her child with no
evidence of harm to the child.”175
Judge Weinstein reached the following conclusions: ACS regularly claimed
neglect against battered mothers; they rarely held abusers accountable; they
failed to offer adequate services to mothers before prosecuting them or removing
their children; they regularly separated battered mothers and children
unnecessarily; they failed to adequately train employees regarding domestic
violence; and their mission statement and written policies provided insufficient
and inappropriate guidance to employees.176 The City’s own expert testified that
the “documents ACS has produced related to assessing domestic violence do not
earn a ‘passing grade.’”177
Judge Weinstein held that there was an agency-wide policy within ACS of
removing children from their mothers without evidence of her neglect and
without seeking prior judicial approval, and that the policy of removing children
solely because the mother had been a victim of domestic violence violated both
the mothers’ and the children’s substantive and procedural due process rights
and infringed on the mothers’ fundamental liberty interests in family privacy.178
Judge Weinstein found, “[t]he evidence reveals widespread and unnecessary
cruelty by agencies of the City of New York towards mothers abused by their
consorts, through forced unnecessary separation of the mothers from their
children, on the excuse that this sundering is necessary to protect the
children.”179 The court found that unnecessary removals actually did more to
harm than to help the children involved and that there was neither a compelling
nor a substantial state interest to justify the policy.180 Judge Weinstein held that
ACS routinely and improperly prosecuted mothers for neglecting their children
when they have done nothing but suffer abuse at the hands of a partner.181 He
stated that the government has “a responsibility to protect a victim of domestic
violence from her partner, a responsibility not met by punishing her through
forcible separation from her children.”182
Judge Weinstein also acknowledged that ACS has the primary
responsibility and duty to protect the children.183 Setting aside the fear that the
child could itself be abused, arguments were also advanced that suggested that
174.
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merely witnessing domestic violence could lead to long-term psychological
damage.184 Expert testimony showed that children exposed to domestic violence
can display short-term effects of post-traumatic stress disorder, behavioral
problems, depression, and other psychological problems.185 It is clear that in the
best circumstances, it is preferable for a child to never be a witness to domestic
violence. However the issue here is whether the effects of separation of children
from their mothers and placement in foster care can be significant enough to
measure against the effects of witnessing domestic abuse. Evidence showed that
removal can have very serious negative effects on children.186 In addition, the
foster care system itself is dangerous. Some scholars assert that children are
actually more likely to be abused in foster care than in the general population:187
“[T]aking a child whose greatest fear is separation from his or her mother and in
the name of ‘protecting’ that child [by] forcing on them, what is in effect, their
worst nightmare. . .is tantamount to pouring salt on an open wound.”188
The court ultimately determined that New York City could no longer
“penalize a mother, not otherwise unfit, who is battered by her partner, by
separating her from her children, nor may children be separated from the
mother, in effect, visiting upon them the sins of their mother’s batterer189“Judge
Weinstein concluded that the best way to protect children in situations of
domestic violence is to provide services and protection to the mothers, the actual
victims. The court concluded that “The consistent policy applied by ACS is to
remove children of abused mothers in violation of their procedural and
substantive due process rights solely because the mother has been abused. No
legislatively appropriate policy, no compelling state interest, justifies these
removals.”190
The court required ACS to end the practice of charging domestic violence
victims with neglect and to end removal of children without court orders. The
court found that ACS caseworkers and managers lacked adequate training about
domestic violence and that they routinely charged mothers with neglect and
removed their children when the mothers had engaged in no violence
themselves, but had been victims.191 The court held that ACS did not conduct
adequate investigation of the facts before removing children and failed to look at
other alternatives to removal.192
Judge Weinstein also found that counsel representing abused mothers in
court were incompetent and did not properly investigate matters or consult with
their clients.193 He called the system worse than ineffective, as it actually resulted
184. Id. at 198.
185. Id. at 197.
186. Id. at 198-99.
187. Mandel, supra note 34, at 1145.
188. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d. at 199 (quoting expert witness Dr. David Pelcovitz).
189. Andy Newman, Children Removal Curbed for Battered Women, N.Y. Times (Dec. 22, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/22/nyregion/children-removal-curbed-for-batteredwomen.html.
190. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
191. Id. at 199.
192. Id. at 250-51.
193. Id. at 253.
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in the delay of hearings and longer separation of mothers and children. The
result is a “practice and policy by the State and City of New York violating the
substantive and procedural constitutional rights of many abused mothers and
their children.”194
The court concluded that ACS’s practices and policies violated both the
substantive and due process rights of mothers and children not to be separated
by the government unless the parent is unfit to care for the child.195 In January
2002, the court granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the City “may
not penalize a mother, not otherwise unfit, who is battered by her partner, by
separating her from her children, nor may children be separated from the
mother, in effect visiting upon them the sins of their mother’s batterer.”196
B. Nicholson v. Scoppetta197
The City of New York appealed the decision. In 2003, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction but,
before reaching the constitutional issues in the case, certified three questions to
the New York State Court of Appeals.198
The first question was whether the definition of a “neglected child” under
Family Court Act § 1012 allowed a court to find a parent responsible for neglect
based on evidence of only two facts: that the parent has been a victim of domestic
violence, and that the child was exposed to that violence.199 The “more” that is
required of the petitioner is a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
“(1) the child’s physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is
in imminent danger of becoming impaired, and (2) the actual or threatened
impairment is clearly attributable to the mother’s failure to exercise a minimum
degree of care toward the child.”200 Only when both elements are satisfied can
the child be considered “neglected”; when the only facts are that the mother was
abused and the child witnessed the abuse, the requirements have not been met.
The New York Court of Appeals held that a domestic violence victim could
be defined per se as neglectful, but only due to her failure to exercise a minimum
degree of care, not because she was a victim of domestic violence or because her
children were exposed to it.201 The mother could be charged with neglect only if
a “preponderance of the evidence establishes that the children were actually or
imminently harmed by reason of her failure to exercise even minimal care in
providing them with proper oversight.”202 The standard for evaluating whether
a battered mother has acted reasonably under the circumstances is for the courts
to consider the “risks attendant to leaving, if the batterer has threatened to kill
194. Id. at 254.
195. See Kathleen A. Copps, Note, The Good, The Bad and The Future of Nicholson v. Scoppetta: An
Analysis of the Effects and Suggestions for Further Improvements, 72 ALB. L. REV. 497, 498 (2009).
196. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E. 2d. 840, 843 (N.Y. 2004).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 844.
199. Id. at 844.
200. Id. at 845.
201. Id. at 847.
202. Id.
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her…risks attendant to staying and suffering continued abuse, risks attendant to
seeking assistance through government channels, potentially increasing the
danger to herself and her children, risks attendant to criminal prosecution
against the abuser; and risks attendant to relocation.”203 A battered mother could
now be charged with neglect, but not because she was a victim of domestic
violence or because her children witnessed the abuse, but “rather because a
preponderance of the evidence establishes that the children were actually or
imminently harmed by reason of her failure to exercise even minimal care in
providing them with proper oversight.”204
The second question certified to the New York State Court of Appeals was
whether the damage to the child resulting from witnessing domestic violence
could be considered a danger or risk to the child’s life or health.205 The court
emphasized that the legislature had clearly expressed its emphasis on preventive
services to maintain family relationships rather than removing children as a
response to problems within the family. The court recognized that two
fundamental principles were in conflict: the objective of keeping families
together and the understanding that the overriding concern is the health and
safety of the child.206 The court found that there could be no blanket
presumption in favor of removal because not every child is harmed by exposure
to domestic violence and removal may do more harm than good: “A fortiori,
exposure of a child to violence is not presumptively ground for removal, and in
many instances removal may do more harm to the child than good.”207
The final question certified to the court was whether a child protective
agency must offer evidence more than merely witnessing abuse to justify
removal of a child.208 The court strongly confirmed that there was no support for
the presumption that if a child has witnessed domestic violence the child has
been harmed and removal is appropriate.209 They concluded that particularized
evidence must exist to justify a court order to remove a child, including evidence
of efforts made to prevent the need for removal.210
This decision had a dramatic impact on ACS practices. For several years
after the decision, the removal of children declined dramatically. The number of
instances where a mother was cited for neglect because of domestic violence also
sharply declined.211 ACS revised its program and instructions about domestic
violence to reflect the decision and made expertise on domestic violence
available to staff.212
The two Nicholson cases have come to represent the way the courts interpret
the standard for neglect. The question remains, however, as to whether the
institutional biases inherent in the child protective field prevent effective
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implementation of the holdings of the Court of Appeals. Has the influence of the
Nicholson decision continued to permeate ACS practices, or is there still a
residual refusal to consider all of the factors involved in situations of domestic
violence to enable fair evaluations of whether removal is appropriate? The
number of children placed in foster care has declined in the ten years since the
decision. However, it is unclear whether ACS has continued to follow the policy
requirements of Nicholson or whether “the peculiar biases to which child
protection is predisposed by its mission, programmatic structure and peculiar
role in our society allow and may even compel even its most progressive
personnel to engage in morally and constitutionally indefensible practices with
respect to mothers in general?”213 In the next section, I review several recent
cases that illustrate the continued victimization of mothers who have
experienced domestic violence and conclude that further efforts need to be made
to change ACS policies.
IV.

POST-NICHOLSON: PROMISE UNFULFILLED

“Despite current plans for reform, this situation is likely to persist unless and
until ACS broadens its mission to include the safety of all victimized household
members, shifts the emphasis in safety planning from placement to support and
preservation, and reflects this broadened mission by fully incorporating
domestic violence expertise into line authority to which field and supervisory
staff are accountable.”214

In light of the changes in ACS stated policies and practices, one can question
why there continue to be cases where victims are improperly treated by ACS
employees. I have selected several cases, one published and two based on
interviews with attorneys at the Brooklyn Defenders Office,215 to illustrate the
difficulty of changing established patterns of behavior. I do not intend these
cases to be a comprehensive review of all instances of removal, nor do I mean to
imply that ACS employees have not introduced some modification of their
practices since the Nicholson decisions. These cases illustrate instances where
Nicholson has not had the desired impact on treatment of victims and are
evidence that progress must still be made.
A. In re David G.216

213. Id.
214. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 221 at (quoting plaintiff’s expert Dr. Evan Stark).
215. I would like to thank Megan S. Brown and Gabriel Freiman, staff attorneys at Brooklyn
Defender Services, for sharing these stories. Brooklyn Defender Services is located in Brooklyn, New
York. The mission of Brooklyn Defender Services is to provide high quality legal representation and
related services to people who cannot afford to retain an attorney. Brooklyn Defender Services
represents 45,000 people each year. Their staff consists of specialized attorneys, social workers,
investigators, paralegals and administrative staff who are experts in their individual fields. Their
staff is highly qualified and specially trained to provide legal representation to people charged with a
crime or facing child welfare proceedings. Every client receives the services needed to defend his or
her case, including an investigator to track down witnesses or recover evidence, a social worker to
improve the life circumstances of the client and a qualified attorney who will analyze the legal issues
in the case, try to negotiate a fair resolution of the matter and represent the client at trial.
216. In re David G. (Blossom B.), 909 N.Y.S.2d 891 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2010).
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In June 2010, New York City Children’s Services (a division of ACS;
hereinafter “NYCCS”) filed neglect proceedings in Family Court against the G.
family based on allegations that the father had abused the mother in the presence
of the three children and that neither parent was ensuring the children’s regular
school attendance.217 Once the petition was filed, the court permitted removal of
the children, placed them with the grandmother and entered a temporary order
of protection against the father.218 Two months later, the mother requested a
hearing for return of her son, David (the two other children remained with
relatives in Pennsylvania), which was granted on several conditions, including
that she enter a domestic violence shelter, attend therapy and enforce the order
of protection against the father. The mother complied with the court order and
moved to a shelter, but the father violated the order of protection and followed
her there. She was afraid for her well-being, and left the shelter without
informing NYCCS. She then missed one therapy session during the following
week. NYCCS made no efforts to find her.219
Although the mother and her son had been repeatedly displaced and forced
to relocate as a result of the father’s abuse, NYCCS showed no indication of
understanding the circumstances or the holdings of Nicholson. They took no
action against the abuser, and instead removed David from his mother’s care and
placed him in foster care.220 A caseworker testified that the mother’s error “cast
doubt on her credibility and demonstrated that she could not be trusted to obey
court orders.”221 NYCCS argued that David was at risk because the mother was
likely to return to the father, but offered no concrete evidence to support this
allegation.222 NYCCS also removed the children from their relatives in
Pennsylvania and placed them in foster care in New York. In September 2010,
the mother requested a hearing for all three children. At the hearing, the NYCCS
caseworker testified that the removal of all three children was necessary due to
the possibility that the mother would return to the father. No evidence was
presented that indicated that the mother was considering returning to the father
or had even spoken to him.223 The agency described their concern that the
mother had failed to keep the agency apprised of her whereabouts and had
missed one therapy session.224 According to the NYCCS worker, “these acts of
non-compliance established that the mother could not always be trusted to
comply with court orders and raised doubts about the reliability of her
statements, including her assertion that she and the father were no longer
together.”225
The court ultimately held that both the emergency removal and continued
removal of the children from their mother’s care were unnecessary.226 Quoting
217.
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extensively from Nicholson v. Scoppetta, it noted that “the public policy in this
State is to keep families together whenever possible [and to] spare children the
trauma of removal and placement in foster care.”227 The court held that NYCCS
had not met its burden of proof and had contravened the conclusions of
Nicholson. The court stated that NYCCS relied on exactly the same assumptions
that the Court of Appeals had clearly rejected as an acceptable rationale for
removals. The removal of David was based on “assumptions, guesswork and
unsupported predictions of future behavior.”228
The court emphasized that the legislature never intended to have a
presumption favoring removal in the Family Court Act. On the contrary, the
policy objective was to keep families together whenever possible: “[W]here one
parent is abusive but the child may safely reside at home with the other parent,
the abuser should be removed.”229
B. In Re Joy230
Sharon D. was a twenty-five-year old African American unmarried woman,
living in Brooklyn. She was raised in Virginia and had attended high school and
two years of college before coming to New York. She had met Michael in 2003
and had a relationship with him for four years before having her first child,
Melody. Michael began to be physically abusive, and Sharon moved to a
domestic violence shelter. Michael was subsequently incarcerated for other
offenses, and Sharon returned to her neighborhood and lived with her brother in
public housing receiving public assistance.
Sharon met Carter in 2011 in her neighborhood. In 2012, she and Melody
moved in with Carter because Sharon’s brother was smoking marijuana in the
home and she did not want Melody exposed to it. Carter had been in and out of
jail for drug convictions, and had eight arrests, including two felonies and five
misdemeanors, but was working full-time. Sharon and Carter were together for
one year before her second child, Joy, was born.
In April 2012, when Sharon was eight months pregnant with Joy, she began
to feel sad and depressed about her ability to handle another child. She sought
help at Brookdale hospital and was assessed and released with a diagnosis of
depression and a recommendation for outpatient services. According to hospital
records, she was not in need of medication or hospitalization.231 Joy was born in
May 2012. Although Carter had been physically abusive in the past, he was
supportive once the baby was born and contributed to the infant’s needs until he
was laid off from his job. After he was unemployed, he began to be abusive to
Sharon, and she attempted to end their relationship. In retaliation, Carter called
the child abuse hotline, accusing her of inadequate guardianship and lack of
providing adequate medical care, based on the allegation that she refused to take
Joy to the doctor. The hotline call triggered an ACS investigation. An ACS
227. Id. at 897 (quoting Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E. 2d. 840, 852 (N.Y. 2004)).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 897 (quoting Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)).
230. Interview with Megan Brown, Staff Attorney, Brooklyn Defender Services (unpublished
documents on file with Brooklyn Defender Services).
231. Id.
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investigator came to Sharon’s home and advised her to take Joy to the doctor.
This investigator reported that there were no marks or bruises on Joy and there
was food in the home. The investigator did have some concerns which she
shared with Sharon based on the conditions of her public housing, the presence
of a pit bull, possible marijuana use, the claim that she suffered from depression,
and her failure to ensure that Joy was fully immunized or to prevent a severe
diaper rash. Nevertheless, the investigator found both children happy and
generally healthy, with no marks or bruises on either child. Both children
appeared to be well cared for. Melody had a good school attendance record
(which is typically a red flag in child protective situations) and was reported to
be a bright child.232
Four days later, ACS workers visited again, and at this time the home was
reported to be cleaner than it had been and Sharon had taken Joy to the doctor.
Sharon had also clearly attempted to remedy the concerns expressed by the
investigator: she had contacted the housing authority to arrange for carbon
monoxide and smoke detectors to be installed in the home, and had attempted to
arrange for further repairs. Over the course of the next few weeks, ACS made
several home visits to Sharon. Sharon was responsive to their requests and
complied with their suggestions. They asked her to give away her dog, and she
did. She agreed to engage with family protective services, and thereafter was
visited once a week by a worker who testified that each time the children were
observed to be well, with no marks or bruises. There was plenty of food in the
home, the bedrooms were neat and clean and Joy was on target with her
developmental milestones. Sharon was communicative with the ACS worker
and returned his phone calls and stayed in touch. On December 11, he made
another visit; both children were happy and healthy and well cared for and
Carter was no longer living in the home. On December 20, he visited again, and
Sharon informed him that she was leaving for Virginia for the holidays. She
called him several times to keep him updated while she was away.
On January 11, the worker began to close the case. He observed that the
children were happy and healthy. On January 16, he wrote a report stating that
the family was stable and that there were no safety concerns regarding welfare of
the children. He noted that Sharon had demonstrated throughout the
intervention that “she [had] the ability to provide care, medical care and
supervision for her two daughters” and that she put the children’s needs ahead
of her own.233
On January 22, 2013, Carter unexpectedly came into the home and assaulted
Sharon, slamming her shoulder into a large television. He became enraged and
left the room. When he returned, he had a knife in his hand. He tried to stab her
and threatened to kill her, all in the presence of Joy. Following the assault,
Sharon called the police and was taken to the hospital to have her injuries
treated. She obtained an Order of Protection on January 25. However, the
previous day, ACS had convened a Child Safety Conference about the family.
Despite the fact that she had just been assaulted and had cooperated fully with
ACS during the prior three months, she was abruptly informed at this conference
232.
233.

Id.
Id.
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that ACS would be filing a neglect petition against her. When she reacted in
despair and anger and stormed out of the conference, ACS decided to remove
Joy from her home.
The only aspect of the situation that changed between January 15, when
ACS was closing the case, and the removal of Joy on January 24, was that Sharon
was assaulted by Carter on January 22, and that she became distraught and
abruptly left the conference after learning that ACS would be charging her with
neglect. ACS testimony reflects that the only reason ACS decided to remove Joy
was because of the statements Sharon made when she left the child safety
conference, which were clearly outbursts made in frustration and out of fear that
her children would be taken away.234 They wanted to penalize Sharon for her
behavior, rather than support her as a victim. Prior to being removed from
Sharon, Joy had been in her mother’s care for her entire life. Once she was
removed, she was placed in foster care and her contact with her mother was
limited to supervised visits.
When ACS filed a neglect petition against Sharon on January 24, she was
not present in court and was not represented by counsel. The court granted
removal of Joy and ACS removed her that evening. On January 29, Sharon
appeared in court, was assigned counsel and requested a § 1028 hearing. 235
The hearing began on January 31, 2013. The Family Court judge, Judge
Gruebel, decided to immediately return Joy to Sharon, stating:
ACS has failed to establish imminent risk of harm, and that continued services
can minimize the risk of harm to the child in the care of her mother. Further the
Court finds that the risk of harm due to the removal of this child from her
mother and placement in non-kinship foster care, with a visitation schedule,
outweighs the risk of being with the parent.236

The court cited Nicholson in the decision, noting that the court must balance
the risk of harm from being in the parent’s care against the risk of harm that their
removal might cause.237 The court determined that the concerns about Sharon
relating to the conditions of her apartment, her psychological condition, and the
failure to obtain immunizations for Joy had all been addressed or could be
addressed with better services from ACS. The court further noted that when
ACS originally filed its petition, they had decided to “have the child remain with
the mother with ‘Court ordered supervision.’” They changed their view and
sought removal of the child because at the Child’s Safety Conference the mother
234. Id.
235. Section 1028 of the New York Family Court Act provides that when a child has been
removed from the home of his or her parent, the parent may request a hearing at any time to
determine whether the child should be returned home. At this hearing, the burden is on the child
protective agency to demonstrate that the child should not be returned to the home. The statute
provides that the court shall return the child to the parent unless it finds “imminent risk” to the
child’s life or health needs. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 1028 (McKinney 2014). In Nicholson v. Scoppetta,
820 N.E. 2d. 840, 845 (N.Y. 2004), the court held that imminent danger “must be near or impending,
not merely possible,” and the court must weigh whether the imminent risk to the child can be
mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid removal and must balance the risk the removal might bring.
236. Interview with Megan Brown, Staff Attorney, Brooklyn Defender Services (unpublished
documents on file with Brooklyn Defender Services).
237. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E. 2d. 840, 852 (N.Y. 2004).
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stormed out stating that she was ‘going to kill the respondent father’ (the alleged
source of the anonymous call to the hotline that precipitated the investigation
and conference).”238 These remarks, uttered in frustration and fear, were the
basis for ACS’s decision to revisit the case, arguing that there was imminent risk
based on prior incidents. However, “[ACS] used those remarks to review what
had previously not been [sic] viewed as substantially concerning, to argue that
this is imminent risk.” The court found that Sharon needed ongoing support and
services, but that the risk of harm from removal would be greater than the risk of
harm keeping Joy with her mother.
This case illustrates the difficulty of implementing the Nicholson approach in
the field. Caseworkers appear more concerned with controlling the behavior of a
victim by using removal of children as a weapon to assert control.
C. In the B. Children239
Adawna was a twenty-eight-year old Latina woman living in Brooklyn. She
had three children: nine-year old twins and an infant. She was separated from
the children’s father, and was on the verge of being evicted from her home when
she became involved with James, who was also twenty-eight years old.
Although Adawna had a supportive family and was planning to go to live with
her grandmother, James was persuasive and convinced her to live with him.
Adawna had been experiencing difficulties ensuring that her older children
attended school on a regular basis, which led to ACS becoming involved with the
family. James encouraged her to send the twins to live with their father, and she
moved into his home with her youngest child, Janisse.
Once Adawna moved in with James, he began to isolate her; he prevented
her from communicating with her family and friends. At the same time, the
children’s father was not properly caring for their children. In particular, he was
ineffective at ensuring that the twins attended school. After Adawna’s family
did not hear for her for several months, they became concerned and begged ACS
to try to locate her.
ACS did attempt to find her, and an ACS worker was able to make contact
with Adawna and arranged to meet with her. James would only allow the ACS
employee to meet with Adawna in public and in his presence, and he made sure
he was sitting right next to Adawna on a bench. He was clearly controlling her
speech and movements. Following this encounter, Adawna disappeared for two
more months, and no one heard from her during that time.
The neighbors in her building began to complain of unusual noises coming
from James’ apartment. On May 29, 2012, the police responded to a call from the
landlord and reportedly found the baby and Adawna tied and bound with duct
tape. James was in the room when they arrived, and they arrested him. The
police found wounds over both of Janisse’s and Adawna’s bodies, and they
found Janisse emaciated and malnourished. James had held them captive in a
238. Interview with Megan Brown, Staff Attorney, Brooklyn Defender Services (unpublished
documents on file with Brooklyn Defender Services).
239. Interview with Gabriel Freiman, Staff Attorney, Brooklyn Defender Services (unpublished
documents on file with Brooklyn Defender Services).
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room for three months; they had not been allowed to leave the room for any
reason.
Adawna stated that James physically and verbally abused her in the
presence of her child and refused to allow her to eat or leave the home. She was
fearful that he would kill her and Janisse because he had previously threatened
to do so if she left him. This is the exact quandary that victims of domestic
violence encounter when they become trapped in a cycle of power, violence and
control by their abusers.240
Following her rescue, Adawna more than adequately met her children’s
needs. She had her older children return to her house. She arranged for medical
appointments, took Janisse for evaluations and signed her up for school. She
found supportive services for herself and her family without the assistance of
ACS. Nevertheless, ACS brought a neglect proceeding against Adawna. This
proceeding placed further trauma and strain on Adawna and her young
daughter as they tried to heal from their traumatic experience.241 ACS included
the older children in the neglect petition and subsequently released them to the
care of their father, who had been inadequately caring for them. This was not a
rational response to the situation and appears to be punishment of Adawna
merely for being a victim of abuse.
When Adawna appeared in Family Court for the first time, she was by
herself, without counsel, and ACS informed her that she would be seeing her
abuser in the courtroom. Her caseworker’s only advice was “not to look at
him.”242 When her assigned counsel met her, she was in a state of total panic
about seeing her abuser for the first time since she was rescued. This shows a
lack of training and sensitivity on the part of caseworkers at ACS in dealing with
a victim who has experienced such a traumatic event.
In addition, despite the fact that the father had eleven domestic violence
incident reports against him, ACS then advised the father of the children to file
for sole custody and to call the police against Adawna if she gave him any
problems. Although ACS stated that they were in the process of attempting to
work out a visitation plan, their objective was clearly to separate Adawna from
her children. ACS’s approach seems illogical since they had complete access to
previous reports and knew that the father had a long history of violence. In
addition, the father actually had no interest in having custody of the children and
had stated that he wanted them to return to living with their mother.
In a meeting with Adawna to review her situation, ACS discovered that she
was taking her children to therapy to help them process the events they had
experienced. ACS reacted as though this was a negative, rather than a helpful,
effort by a concerned mother. ACS immediately threatened to hold a child safety
conference to discuss removal. The mother was properly taking advantage of
available social services to help her family, and as a consequence ACS was
attempting to remove her children. The approach ACS took was traumatic for the
family and shows a lack of understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence.
240. Letter from Brooklyn Family Defense Project to Family Court Legal Services, July 13, 2012
(on file with author) (discussing Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E. 2d. 840 (N.Y. 2004).
241. Id.
242. Id.
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Instead of using their abilities to support her as a survivor of abuse, ACS
appeared to blame Adawna for the violence, and attempted to undermine her
efforts to create a better life for her family.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
“Because the psychological and physical risks to children in placement can be as
great, or greater, than allowing them to remain in situations where protections
are unsure, the balance of harms is a critical piece to be worked out jointly with
the non-offending parent.”243

A review of neglect proceedings brought by ACS against victims of
domestic violence over the past ten years suggests that the family courts are
attempting to comply with Nicholson. The number of children entering the foster
care system decreased by 22% between 2003 and 2012 from 13,598 to 10,594.244 It
is now rare that the Court upholds the removal of children from a battered
mother solely because she is a victim of domestic violence. However, ACS
practices appear to still fall short of fully implementing the tenets of Nicholson.
ACS has made improvements in holding abusers accountable, but still
regularly alleges neglect against battered mothers, who are much easier targets.
As evidenced by the situations described above, there are still instances where
the implementation of Nicholson has fallen short of its directives. ACS still fails to
consistently offer adequate services to victims of domestic violence before
prosecuting them or removing their children. There are a variety of preventive
services that ACS should offer to families experiencing domestic violence. These
include offering adequate shelters, family and individual therapy, legal
advocacy, medical advocacy, social service referrals and advocacy, parenting
skills classes, employment referrals and housing assistance.245 While ACS has
improved the general availability of these programs, they are still not in
adequate supply. According to the information provided on the ACS website, it
is the caseworker’s responsibility to identify the services necessary to protect the
child and help the family.246 Nevertheless, as evidenced by In Re David G., In Re
Joy, and In the Matter of B. Children, it seems too tempting to take the easiest
solution of removing a child, rather than following the time-intensive path of
focusing more intently on service provision and attacking the underlying
problems. ACS employees are often too ready to judge victims and may not be
properly trained to make sensitive decisions and balance outcomes.
ACS continues to inadequately train its employees regarding domestic
violence and fails to incorporate domestic violence expertise into the standards
against which case workers and supervisors are held.
Although the
requirements to become an ACS caseworker include a college degree with
“twenty-four credits in any combination of social work, psychology, sociology,
243. Stark, supra note 2, at 709.
244. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FOSTER CARE FY2003-FY2011 ENTRIES,
EXITS, AND NUMBERS OF CHILDREN IN CARE ON THE LAST DAY OF EACH FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR , available
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb.
245. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
246. Preventative Services, N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILD. SERVS., http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs
/html/support_families/preventive_services.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
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human services, criminal justice, education. . .nursing, or cultural
anthropology,”247 there is no requirement to be trained in domestic violence
prevention or counseling. Caseworkers have tremendous discretion to remove
children, unbridled by adequate supervision.248
Without sufficient
understanding of the complications surrounding domestic violence, there cannot
be a complete assessment of the family situation. In fact, “[d]espite evidence that
some proportion of battered women experience moderate to severe symptoms of
depression, post-traumatic stress disorders or other mental health or behavioral
problems, there is no evidence that their capacity to parent is compromised as a
result.”249
The manner in which caseworkers treat female victims of violence has
implications for their recovery and the well-being of their families. Treating
victims with respect, offering positive support, and giving them a sense of
control increases the odds of positive outcomes.250 Coordinated efforts by city
agencies, and the perception by victims that there are coordinated approaches,
improves the recovery of victims.251A more coordinated approach to assisting
victims of domestic violence would require community agencies to work
together. These agencies should represent law enforcement, prosecution,
nonprofit victim service agencies and the medical and legal communities. The
New York City Mayor’s Office to Combat Domestic Violence, created under
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, is a vital but insufficient step towards creating this
coordination. This Office has opened Family Justice Centers in several boroughs
in New York, where victims of domestic violence can receive criminal justice,
civil legal and social services in one location. The Mayor’s Office needs to
coordinate these centers with ACS to create adequate assistance and equal
treatment for all victims of domestic violence.
There is hope that we will see progress in the practices and policies of ACS.
In December 2013, Mayor-elect Bill de Blasio named Gladys Carrión as his child
welfare commissioner for ACS. In May 2014, Commissioner Carrión announced
a number of improvements at ACS, including adding staff members and
improving collaboration with other city agencies. She has also hired an internal
monitor to oversee the implementation of the improvements. ACS now has an
opportunity to rectify the injustices perpetrated by ACS and to change the
approach of the agency towards victims of domestic violence and their
children.252

247. Become A Child Protective Specialist, N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S SERVS.,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html/about/work_cps.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
248. Perrone, supra note 84, at 660.
249. Stark, supra note 2, at 710.
250. Janine M. Zweig & Martha R. Burt, The Effects on Victims of Victim Service Programs Funded By
the STOP Formula Grants Program, URBAN INSTITUTE (Feb. 2003), http://www.urban.org/
uploadedPDF/410645_VictimServicePrograms.pdf.
251. Id. “Coordinated effort improves reported outcomes whether it is between victim service and
legal system agencies, victim service and non-legal system agencies, or legal system agencies and
non-victim service agencies.”
252. Gladys Carrión, Commissioner, New York City Administration for Children’s Services,
Testimony to the New York City Council Committee on General Welfare (May 8, 2014)(transcript
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/downloads/pdf/Child_Welfare_5_8_14_FINAL.pdf).

